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IN THE SUPREME COURT <)l I IT All
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 20030439-SC

ANTHONY A. SADDLER,
Defendant/Respondent.
BRIEF OF PETITIONER
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. The
Supreme I mini linn piihihi linn pui'iiiiiil In I liLilli l iinlli 'uui

'H "• ] il % I < /!

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the
court of appeals for correctness and the correctness of that decision "turns on whether that
mill .iiittiiraln'l " int fu i" <' mi! l l i K il ! i i i il < o u i l ' " " \k

IMI IIII

inula I hi,1 ii| pr npniiil

iduiiliii I of

review.". State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,1f 9, 22 P.3d 1242.
In reviewing a magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant, the appellate court

cause existed/ "State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104,

f 14,48 P.3d 872 (quoting State v. Thurman,
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846 P.2d 1256, 1259-60 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah
1989)). The Court "afford[s] the magistrate's decision great deference and considers] the
affidavit relied upon by the magistrate in its entirety and in a common sense fashion. Id.
(quoting Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1260 (quoting Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
U.S. Const amend, IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

Following the execution of a search warrant, defendant was charged with unlawful
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378( 1 )(a)(iii) (Supp. 2000), and unlawful possession of cocaine, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000), both third degree felonies. R. 1-3. Defendant moved to
suppress the evidence, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. R. 3557. The trial court denied defendant's motion. R. 127:12-13. Defendant thereafter entered a
conditional guilty plea to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and the cocaine
charge was dismissed. R. 79-84. In pleading guilty, defendant reserved the right to appeal
the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. R. 81. The trial court sentenced defendant
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to an indeterminate prison term of zero-to-five years, but stayed execution thereof and placed
defendant on supervised probation for 24 months. R. 107.
The court of appeals reversed the order denying defendant's motion to suppress. State
v. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 27,67 P.3d 1025. Judge Judith Billings dissented. Id. at
^It 30-45. This Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari.
SUMMARY OF FACTS

On June 15, 2000, Detective Bill McCarthy of the West Valley City Police
Department obtained a warrant to search defendant's home for marijuana, cocaine, and items
related to the distribution of drugs. R. 76-78; Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 2. In a search
of defendant's house later that day, police seized one gram of cocaine, 277 grams of
marijuana, drug packaging material, triple beam scales, and $478.00 in cash. R. 35-57,6069; Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 6.
Search Warrant Affidavit
In issuing the search warrant, the magistrate relied on Detective McCarthy' s Affidavit
in Support of Search Warrant R. 70-74; Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, atffif2-5.
Information from Confidential Informant
The affidavit was based in large part on information received "from a confidential
informant" (CI). R. 72. Detective McCarthy "ask[ed]" that the magistrate "not [ ] require
[him] to publish the CFs name" because McCarthy "believe[d] that the CI may be harmed if
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[her] name were published." R. 72.l The CI told Detective McCarthy that defendant had
admitted to her that he "sells marijuana and cocaine." R. 72. She also said that she had
observed in defendant's home (1) three scales "used to weigh out repackaged marijuana for
resale"; (2) cocaine and packaging material; (3) the sale of controlled substances by
defendant; and (4) three to four pounds of marijuana in the last week to ten days. R. 72. In
addition, the CI told Detective McCarthy that she had observed defendant use cocaine in the
home and carry cocaine and marijuana on his person. R. 72.
Although the CI did not describe the precise nature of her relationship with defendant,
she told Detective McCarthy that she has known him for over one year, that she has been to
his home "numerous times," that she has observed him use cocaine and marijuana on
numerous occasions in the past year, and that she herself used marijuana with him on several
of those occasions. R. 72. As further evidence of her familiarity with defendant, the CI
advised Detective McCarthy of defendant's "hours of operation," that defendant was home
"infrequently and usually during the late evening hours," that his "only legitimate source of
income is from a part time waiter's job at a Salt Lake City restaurant," and that he "sells
controlled substances to be able to afford his own usage and as a separate source of income."
R. 73. The CI also advised Detective McCarthy that defendant had told her he recently
purchased the house, R. 73.

1

The CI's gender cannot be determinedfromthe affidavit. The State, however, uses
the feminine gender when referring to the CI to more easily distinguish between defendant
and the CI.
4
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Independent Police Investigation
To corroborate the CI's information, Detective McCarthy performed surveillance of
defendant's home between 8:00 p.m. on June 14, 2000 and 6:00 a.m. on June 15,2000. R.
73. Initially, Detective McCarthy observed no one at the residence. R. 73. However, after
midnight, he "observed some short term traffic" at the residence that, based on his training,
he believed was drug-related. See R. 73-74. At Detective McCarthy's direction, a patrol
officer performed a traffic stop of one of the short term visitors to defendant's home and
arrested him on outstanding warrants. R. 73. In a search incident to arrest, police discovered
approximately one-half ounce of marijuana on the driver's person and a plastic twist of
cocaine residue in the car. R. 73. However, no paraphernalia used to ingest marijuana or
cocaine was found in either the car or on the driver's person. R. 73.
Confidential Informant's Credibility
In his affidavit, Detective McCarthy identified numerous factors that supported a
belief that the CI's information was accurate and truthful, including: (l)the CI's
observations werefirst-hand;(2) the CI would recognize the substance observed because she
had used it; (3) the CI provided the information "out of a sense of guilt and desire to stop the
sales and usage of controlled substances into [sic] the community"; (4) the CI had "not been
promised nor paid for any of the information provided"; (5) Detective McCarthy observed a
vehicle registered to a female companion of defendant, which vehicle the CI indicated
defendant frequently used; (6) the CI indicated that defendant worked only part-time, and
when officers checked at his place of employment, defendant was not at work and no one
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there knew when he was scheduled to return to work; (7) the CI's observations were over a
long period of time and she stated "that the illicit sales operation is ongoing and has been
long term"; (8) short-term traffic consistent with drug activity was observed at defendant's
home in the early morning hours of June 15,2000; and (9) one of the short-term visitors was
stopped and found with marijuana and packaging material with cocaine residue but with no
drug paraphernalia, suggesting that the marijuana was purchasedfromdefendant's home. R.
73-74.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under the "totality of the circumstances" test articulated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213,103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983), the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause
to search defendant's house. The supporting affidavit revealed that the informant knew
defendant for over a year, had been to defendant's house numerous times, and had seen
defendant sell drugsfromthe house. The informant indicated that defendant's sale of drugs
was ongoing and that defendant had admitted to him that he sells cocaine and marijuana.
Moreover, the informant indicated that he had observed in defendant's home scales used to
weigh repackaged marijuana for resale, cocaine and packaging material, and within the past
week to ten days, three to four pounds of marijuana. The affidavit also revealed that police
had corroborated much of the information provided by the informant. In addition to
corroborating some of the innocent details, police observed short-term traffic consistent with
drug sales at defendant's home in the hours after midnight. Moreover, a stop of one of the
short-term visitors revealed approximately one-half ounce of marijuana. Where police found
6
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no corresponding paraphernalia, they reasonably concluded that the visitor had just
purchased marijuana from the residence. Contrary to the court of appeals' decision, the
foregoing facts and others provided a substantial basis for the magistrate's probable cause
finding.
The majority opinion is erroneous in several respects. Contrary to Gates, the majority
opinion analyzes the search warrant affidavit in terms of separate and essentially independent
sub-tests that are either satisfied or failed. The majority opinion improperly focuses on the
category of informants rather than on the unique characteristics of a particular informant.
The majority opinion also insists on more detail than is required under Gates. And finally,
the majority opinion errs in refusing to recognize the informant's statement against penal
interest as a factor bolstering reliability.
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ARGUMENT
THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE
A challenge to a search warrant is governed by the "totality of the circumstances"
standard as articulated twenty years ago in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317
(1983). As observed by Judge Billings in her dissent, the majority pays only "lip service" to
that standard. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 44 (Billings, J., dissenting). Indeed, the
majority's approach in deciding whether or not certain factors have been "satisfied," in
dissecting the affidavit line-by-line, and in focusing on the unknowns rather than what is
known, see id. atfflf12-13, directly contradicts the teaching of Gates, turning what should be
a "practical, nontechnical conception" into an "excessively technical dissection" of the
affidavit and a "rigid demand that specific 'tests' be satisfied by every informant's tip."
Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31, 234, 103 S.Ct. at 2328, 2330 (internal quotes and citations
omitted).
In the words of the dissent, the majority opinion "undermines what should be our
preference for searches conducted pursuant to search warrants." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82,
at % 44 (Billings, J., dissenting). If left undisturbed, the decision will set back search and
seizure jurisprudence in this State twenty years.
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A.

THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED PROBABLE CAUSE
UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES STANDARD
ARTICULATED IN ILLINOIS V. GATES

1. The Gates Standard Rejects Hypertechnical Dissection of Search
Warrant Affidavits in Favor of Practical, Common Sense Review
(a) The Underlying Facts in Gates
In Illinois v. Gates, the Bloomingdale, Illinois Police Department received an
anonymous handwritten letter that read as follows:

This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town
who strictly make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and
Lance Gates, they live on Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the
condominiums. Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife
drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be loaded up with
drugs, then Lance flys down and drives it back. Sue flys back after
she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there
again and Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive it back.
At the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with
over $100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have over $100,000.00
worth of drugs in their basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their
entire living on pushers.
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch.
They are friends with some big drugs dealers, who visit their house
often.
Lance & Susan Gates
Greenway
in Condominiums
Gates, 462 U.S. at 225,103 S.Ct. at 2325. After receiving the letter, police corroborated the
innocent details provided in the letter. They confirmed that Lance Gates resided in a
condominium on Greenway in Bloomingdale. Id. at 225-26, 103 S.Ct. at 2325. They
9
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verified that an "L. Gates" had made reservations to flyfromChicago to West Palm Beach,
Florida on May 5 and federal agents confirmed that Gates made the trip on that day. Id. ^t
226,103 S.Ct. at 2325-26. After Gates disembarked in Florida, federal agents followed him
to a motel room registered to Susan Gates. Id. at 226, 103 S.Ct. at 2326. The following
morning, agents observed Gates and an unidentified woman leave the motel in a Mercury—
bearing a license plate number registered to a Hornet station wagon owned by Gates—and
travel northbound on an interstatefrequentlyused by Chicago-bound travelers. Id.
Based on the letter and the information verifying the Gates' travel plans, police
secured a warrant to search the Gates' home and car. Id. When Lance and Susan Gates
arrived home nearly 24 hours after their departure from Florida, police were waiting with
warrant in hand. Id. Police found 350 pounds of marijuana in the trunk of the car and
marijuana, weapons, and other contraband in the house. Id.
(b) The Aguilar-Spinelli Test Applied bv the Illinois Supreme Court
Applying the two-pronged test developed under Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84
S.Ct. 1509 (1964), mdSpinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584 (1969), the
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the warrant was not supported by probable cause.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 227-29 & n.3, 103 S.Ct. at 2326-27 & n.3. Under the Aguilar-Spinelli
test, a search warrant affidavit based on an informant's tip must demonstrate (1) the basis of
the informant's knowledge that the evidence is at the location to be searched ("basis of
knowledge" prong), and (2) the basis for believing that the informant is credible or the
information is true (the "veracity" or "reliability" prong). Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114,84 S.Ct.
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1514; Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415-16, 89 S.Ct. at 588-89. The Illinois Supreme Court
concluded that the affidavit did not satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli test because it did not indicate
the basis of the informant's knowledge and corroborated only innocent details of the tip. Id.
at 229-30, 103 S.Ct. at 2327-28.
(c) The 'Totality of the Circumstances" Standard Established in Gates
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the search
warrant was supported by probable cause. In doing so, it abandoned the overly "rigorous"
and "excessively technical" test that had developed after its decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli
in favor of a "totality of the circumstances approach." Id. at 230,234-38,103 S.Ct. at 2328,
2330-32. Gates held that "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit..., there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place." Gates, 462 U.S. at 238,103 S.Ct. at 2332 (emphasis added).
The Court explained that in dealing with probable cause, courts simply deal with
probabilities—"'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'" Id. at 231, 103 S.Ct. at 2328
(quoting Brinegarv. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1210 (1949)).
The Court observed that "probable cause is a fluid concept... [that is] not readily, or
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Id. at 232,103 S.Ct. at 2329. The Court
agreed that an informant's reliability and the basis of the informant's knowledge are
"relevant considerations in the totality of the circumstances analysis," but rejected the
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"compartmentalization" of these factors "into two largely independent channels" of inquiry.
Id. at 231 n.6,233,103 S.Ct. at 2328 n.6,2329. The Court explained that "a deficiency in
one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong
showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability" Id. at 233,103 S.Ct. at 2329
(emphasis added).
The Supreme Court further observed that "the duty of a reviewing court is simply to
ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for... concluding]' that probable cause
existed.'" Id. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. at 2332 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S 257,
271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 736 (I960)); accord State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1259-60 (Utah
1993). In other words, "after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit
should not take the form of de novo review." Id. at 236,103 S.Ct. at 2331 (internal quotes
and citations omitted); accord State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989). Rather, a
reviewing court should pay "great deference" to the magistrate's probable cause
determination. A/.at236,103 S.Ct. at 2331; accord Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991. "Agrudging
or negative attitude by reviewing courts towards warrants is inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant." Id. at 236,
103 S.Ct. at 2331 (internal quotes and citations omitted). Gates thus held that '"the
resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the
preference to be accorded to warrants.'" Id. at 237 n.10,103 S.Ct. at 2331 n. 10 (quoting
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 746 (1965).
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(d) Upholding the Warrant in Gates
Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the Supreme Court in Gates concluded
that a substantial basis existed for the magistrate's probable cause finding. Id. at 246, 103
S.Ct. at 2336. The Court noted "that, standing alone, the anonymous letter . . . would not
provide the basis for a magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to believe
contraband would be found in the Gates' car and home." Id. at 227, 103 S.Ct. at 2326. It
held, however, that "[t]he corroboration of the letter's predictions that the Gates' car would
be in Florida, that Lance Gates would fly to Florida in the next day or so, and that he would
drive the car north toward Bloomingdale all indicated, albeit not with certainty, that the
informant's other assertions also were true." Id. at 244, 103 S.Ct. at 2335. The Court
concluded that such corroboration "suffices for the practical, common-sense judgment called
for in making a probable cause determination." Id. Continuing, the Court held that "[i]t is
enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that 'corroboration through other sources
of information reduced the chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale,' thus providing ;a
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.'" Id. at 244-45, 103 S.Ct. at 2335.
2. A Substantial Basis Existed for the Magistrate's Probable Cause
Finding That Drugs Would Be Found in Defendant's Home
Applying the totality of the circumstances test to this case, a substantial basis existed
for the magistrate's probable cause finding that drugs and other evidence of illegal
distribution would be found in defendant's home.
The CI informed police how she obtained the information that drugs and other
evidence of distribution were in defendant's home. She informed police that she had known

.

1 3 '

;

" ' " '

:

' • • . ' • • ' •

• • ' - • '
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defendant for over a year, had been to his home "numerous times," and had used drugs with
him. R. 72. She indicated that defendant had admitted to her that he "sells marijuana and
cocaine" and that she personally had observed him sell controlled substancesfromthe home.
R. 72. She stated that defendant's "illicit sales operation [was] ongoing and has been long
term" and that she was aware that defendant sold drugs to afford his own drug usage and as a
separate source of income. R. 72-73. She also informed police that she had observed in
defendant's home cocaine, packaging material, and three scales "used to weigh out
repackaged marijuana for resale." Finally, she said she had observed three to four pounds of
marijuana in defendant's home within the last week to ten days. R. 72.
Other facts, either provided by the CI or obtained by police, bolstered the reliability of
the information. For example, the CI admitted to having used drugs with defendant. R. 72.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that such admissions against penal interest
"carry their own indicia of credibility." United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 575, 583,91
S.Ct. 2075, 2082 (1971). This particularly holds true where, as here, the CI was not
promised or paid anything in exchange for the information and provided the information "out
of a sense of guilt and desire to stop the sales and usage of controlled substances." R. 73; cf.
Norrisy 2001 UT 104, at f 18 (holding that" 'reliability and veracity are generally assumed
when the informant is a citizen who receives nothing from the police in exchange for the
information'").
The CI also informed police of defendant's hours of operation, indicating that he "is
home infrequently and usually during the late evening hours." R. 73. To corroborate the
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CI's claim, police performed surveillance of defendant's home between 8:00 p.m. on June
14,2000 and 6:00 a.m. on June 15,2000. R. 73. As predicted, police initially observed no
one at the residence. R. 73. And as predicted, police observed "some short term traffic"
after midnight which was consistent with drug sales. See R. 73. Moreover, police stopped
one of the short-term visitors to the apartment, and after arresting the visitor on an
outstanding warrant, found approximately one-half ounce of marijuana on his person. R. 73.
However, no paraphernalia to inhale the marijuana was found on the driver's person or in his
car, suggesting to the trained officer that the substance had been purchased at defendant's
home. R. 73-74.
Police also confirmed some of the innocent details provided by the CI. For example,
the CI indicated that defendant worked part-time at a Salt Lake City restaurant. R. 73.
Consistent with that claim, defendant was not at work when police checked with the
restaurant on June 15,2000 "and it was unknown when he was scheduled to return." R. 74.
Police also found at the home the vehicle which the CI informed police defendant used and
confirmed that it was registered to defendant's female companion, as asserted by the CI. See
R.73.
The foregoing facts, when viewed together, provided more than a sufficient basis for
the magistrate's probable cause finding. Consistent with the warrant requirements of the
Fourth Amendment, the affidavit "informed [the magistrate] of some of the underlying
circumstances from which the informant concluded that... narcotics were where [s]he
claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer
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concluded that the informant... was 'credible' or [her] information 'reliable.'" Gates, 462
U.S. at 231 n.6, 103 S.Ct. at 2328 n.6 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(emphasis in original). No more was required.
Indeed, the facts supporting a probable cause finding here were more compelling than
those which supported the probable cause finding in Gates. Whereas the informant in Gates
provided no information indicating the basis of his knowledge, the informant here indicated
that she had known defendant for over a year, had been to his home numerous times, and had
personally observed the evidence and heard defendant admit that he sold drugs. Whereas the
informant in Gates was anonymous, the informant here was known to the officer. See infra,
at 22-23. Like the police in Gates, police here corroborated innocent details. However,
unlike the police in Gates, the police here also corroborated the allegations of criminal
conduct, stopping a short-term visitor and finding on him approximately one-half ounce of
marijuana, but no paraphernalia.
B.

THE MAJORITY OPINION CONFLICTS WITH THE MANDATES OF GATES

The majority opinion misapplies Gates and is fraught with errors. In a nutshell, the
majority applies a rigid, excessively technical test similar to the Aguilar-Spinelli test, insists
on more detail than is required under Gates, and erroneously interprets the law on a variety
of other issues.
1. The Majority Opinion Compartmentalizes the Inquiry Rather Than
Reviewing the Facts as a Whole
While purporting to follow Gates, the majority "in reality applies the older and stricter
Aguilar-Spinelli test." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at % 44 (Billings, J., dissenting). In
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reviewing the sufficiency of the affidavit, the majority engages in an analysis examining
whether "portions" of the "totality of the circumstances" test have been "satisfied." Saddler,
2003 UT App 82, at ^ff 12-13. The majority concludes that "the basis of knowledge portion
is satisfied" but that "the veracity and reliability portions are not satisfied" Id. at^Hf 12-13
(emphases added). The majority thus creates separate and essentially independent sub-tests
within the "totality of the circumstances" inquiry that are either satisfied or failed: an
informant's basis of knowledge, an informant's 'Veracity," and the report's "reliability." It
then engages in a game of addition and subtraction of sorts, concluding that passing the
"basis of knowledge" test does not overcome the failure to pass the "veracity" and
"reliability" tests. See id. at f 27. This approach is contrary to Gates.
Referring to its decision in Aguilar, the Supreme Court in Gates observed that it never
intended to impose such a "rigid compartmentalization" of the probable cause inquiry and
rejected such an approach. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 n.6, 103 S.Ct. at 2328 n.6. Gates held
that basis of knowledge, veracity, and reliability instead "should be understood simply as
closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question
whether there is probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a
particular place." Gates, 462 U.S. at 230,103 S.Ct. at 2328. In other words, the reviewing
court should not consider these factors separately, but should consider them as a whole. The
Saddler majority's compartmentalization of those factors violated that principle.
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2. The Majority Opinion Improperly Focuses on the Category of
Informants Rather Than on the Unique Characteristics of a
Particular Informant
In its effort to determine whether the veracity and reliability "portions" of the test
were satisfied, the majority creates a "superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules . . .
[that] "cannot be reconciled with the fact that many warrants are—quite properly, issued on
the basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen applying a standard less
demanding than those used in more formal legal proceedings." Id. at 235-36, 103 S.Ct. at
2331.
For example, in analyzing the CI's credibility, the majority imposes another rigid test,
liftedfromKaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231,235-36 (Utah App. 1997), requiring the
court to determine whether the CI "qualified" as a citizen informant or police informant. See
Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at ff 11-14. However, in focusing on what category the CI may
fit into, the majority regresses into an "excessively technical dissection" of the affidavit that
is not useful. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 234,103 S.Ct. at 2330. By doing so, the majority gives
"undue attention [to] isolated issues that cannot sensibly be divorced from the other facts
presented to the magistrate." Id. at 234-35,103 S.Ct. at 2330.
The majority implicitly creates a set of rules that an informant must meet to qualify as
a citizen-informant The majority opinion suggests that a citizen-informant must be an
"average" citizen who volunteers the information to police. See id. at f 13-14 (citing State v.
White, 851 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah App. 1993)). The majority suggests that someone who
has participated in criminal activity may not qualify as a citizen-informant—even if he or she
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has not been promised or paid anything in return. Id. The majority implies that to qualify
for such favored status, the criminal informant must have indicated "a remorse for his past
participation or a determination to avoid future involvement." Id. at f 14.
The majority's analysis misses the mark. The reliability of an informant turns not on
whether the CI qualifies as a citizen-informant or is relegated to the level of a policeinformant, but rather whether the circumstances as a whole suggest that the informant was
credible. As noted in Gates, "[informants' tips doubtless come . . . from many different
types of persons" and "like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman on the scene[,
they] may vary greatly in their value and reliability.'" Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 103 S.Ct. at
2329. (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924 (1972)). As
such, "'[r]igid legal rules,'" such as those created by the majority here, '"are ill-suited to an
area of such diversity.'" Id. (quoting Adams, 407 U.S. at 147,92 S.Ct. at 1924).
The majority's attempt here to pigeonhole the CI into one category or the other
demonstrates the futility of such an exercise. See Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 14 (holding
that "we do not know whether CI was a citizen- or police-informant"). It also demonstrates
how rules that may appear sensible under one set of facts prove ill-considered in other
circumstances. For example, the majority acknowledges, albeit reluctantly, that the CI
'"provided the information out of a . . . desire to stop the sales and usage of controlled
substances into the community,' and that [the] CI was4 [neither] promised nor paid for any of
the information provided.'" Saddler,2003 UT App 82, at f 14 (second bracket in original).
However, the majority concludes that those facts carry no weight here because they bolster
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the reliability of only citizen-informants. Id. (citing State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515,517 (Utah
App. 1992)). The majority has it backwards. Citizen-informants are credible because they
"volunteer information out of concern for the community and not for personal benefit."
State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284,286 (Utah App. 1990). If that is the motive of an informant
who has in the past smoked marijuana, then like the majority's "citizen informant," his or her
credibility is enhanced.
3. The Majority Opinion Insists on More Detail Than Is Required
Under Gates
The majority opinion also imposes a burden of detail far greater than is required under
the Fourth Amendment. A search warrant affidavit must contain more than an officer's
conclusory statement that he or she has received reliable informationfroma credible person
that evidence will be found in a particular place. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238,103 S.Ct. at 233233 (citing Aguilar, 378 U.S 108,84 S.Ct. 1509)). "Sufficient information must be presented
to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a
mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others." Id. This does not mean, however, "'that
each factual allegation which the affiant puts forth must be independently documented, or
that each and every fact which contributed to his conclusions be spelled out in the
complaint."' Id. at 231 n.6,103 S.Ct. at 2328 n.6 (quoting Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 224-25, 84
S.Ct. at 1371). All that is required is that '"enough information be presented to the
[magistrate] to enable him to make thejudgment that the charges are not capricious and are
sufficiently supported tojustify bringing into play the further steps ofthe criminalprocess'"
Id. (quoting Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 224-25, 84 S.Ct. at 1371) (emphasis in original).
20
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(a) Detailing the CFs Relationship with Defendant and Detective
As reflected in the affidavit, the CI told Detective McCarthy that (1) she has known
defendant for over one year, (2) she has been to his home "numerous times," (3) she has
observed him use cocaine and marijuana on numerous occasions in the past year, and (4) she
herself used marijuana with him on several of those occasions. R. 72. She also advised
Detective McCarthy that that defendant "sells controlled substances to be able to afford his
own usage and as a separate source of income." R. 73. Nevertheless, the majority complains
that "[w]e do not know the type of relationship [the] CI had with [defendant], for what
purpose the CI visited defendant, "how" the CI knew defendant, "or when and how often
[the] CI visited [defendant's] residence." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, atfflf19, 21.
The Fourth Amendment does not require the detail required by the majority here. As
held in Gates, the Fourth Amendment "require[s] only that some facts bearing on [the
reliability or veracity of an informant] be provided to the magistrate." Gates, 462 U.S. at
231 n.6,103 S.Ct. at 2328 n.6. It is enough to show that the CI was "'relying on something
more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based
merely on an individual's general reputation.'" Id. at 2327 n.3,103 S.Ct. at 229 n.3 (quoting
Aguilar, 393 U.S. at 416, 89 S.Ct. at 589).
The majority also complains that "we do not know whether CI and McCarthy met
face-to-face or communicated by telephone or letter," whether McCarthy "ever... had the
opportunity to evaluate CPs truthfulness," whether McCarthy knew the CI's identity and
thus "subjected himself to the penalty of providing false information," and whether CI had
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ever provided McCarthy information before and whether this information proved reliable."
Id. at f 16. While each of the alleged unknowns might have enhanced the reliability of the
informant, they are not required for afindingof probable cause.
In the first place, Gates does not require that the credibility of the informant be
established beyond doubt. As noted in Gates, "anonymous tips seldom could survive [such]
a rigorous application," and yet, they "frequently contribute to the solution of otherwise
'perfect crimes.'" Gates, 462 U.S. at 237-38, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. "While a conscientious
assessment of the basis for crediting such tips is required by the Fourth Amendment, a
standard that leaves virtually no place for anonymous citizen informants"—like the one
imposed by the majority here—"is not." Id.
In the second place, the majority's treatment of the CI as an anonymous informant is
error. In his affidavit, Detective McCarthy did not expressly state that he knew the
informant's identity. However, he did "ask" that the magistrate "not [ ] require [him] to
publish the CI's name" because McCarthy "believe[d] that the CI may be harmed if [her]
name were published." R. 72. Thus, the only reasonable inference is that Detective
McCarthy knew the CI's identity, because he requested that he not be required to divulge her
name. Id. No such request would be necessary if he did not know it. As noted by the
dissent, "[o]ne cannot publish a name one does not know." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f
34 (Billings, J., dissenting).
Despite this reasonable inference, the majority makes a contrary inference, treating
the CI as an anonymous informant. The majority reasons that "[i]t is not reasonable to infer,
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without more information, that CI, who was too afraid to allow his name to be published in
the affidavit, was not also too afraid to give his name to the police officer drafting the
affidavit." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 16 & n.3. This inference, however, is
unreasonable in light of the detective's request that he not be required to publish the name.
Even if it could be said that the affidavit was ambiguous in this regard, this Court has
made clear, as the dissent points out, that the reviewing court "must defer to the magistrate
where, given the affidavit's language, the magistrate could reasonably construe a meaning
that favors a probable cause determination." Id. at f 34 (Billings, J., dissenting) (citing State
v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987,992 (Utah 1989)). By drawing a contrary inference, the majority's
decision is in conflict with the Supreme Court's mandate in Gates that courts pay "great
deference" to the magistrate's probable cause determination. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 236,
103S.Ct.at2331.
(b) Detailing Defendant's Criminal Activity
The majority laments that we do not know how much contraband the CI saw, "when
[s]he saw it," where [s]he saw it, "how often or how recently" she observed it, or "how much
detail [the] CI gave" regarding these facts. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, atfflf19,21. A review
of the affidavit reveals otherwise. The affidavit stated that the CI told police that she "has
been to the premises numerous times, the most recent being within the last week to ten days,
and observed approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana." R. 72. Thus, contrary to the conclusion
of the court of appeals, the magistrate was in fact informed as to when the CI saw the
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marijuana (within 7-10 days), where she saw it (defendant's home), and how much she saw
(3-4 lbs).
Because the allegation in the affidavit was not as clear as it otherwise might have
been, the majority holds that it "cannot reasonably infer that it was during this visit that CI
saw the marijuana." Saddler, 2003 UT 82, at J 19 n.4. Again, the majority draws an
inference against probable cause where it could "reasonably construe a meaning that favors a
probable cause determination." Id. at f 34 (Billings, J., dissenting) (citing Babbell, 770 P.2d
at 992). By drawing a contrary inference, the majority exhibits a "grudging or negative
attitude" towards the search warrant which "is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's
strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant." Gates, 462 U.S. at 236,103
S.Ct. at 2331 (internal quotes and citations omitted). As once noted by the Supreme Court,
"[a] policeman's affidavit 'should not be judged as an entry in an essay contest,' but, rather,
must be judged by the facts it contains." Harris, 403 U.S. at 579,91 S.Ct. at 2080 (citations
omitted).
The affidavit also indicated that the CI told Detective McCarthy that she has observed
in defendant's home (1) three scales "used to weigh out repackaged marijuana for resale;"
(2) cocaine and packaging material; and (3) the sale of controlled substances by defendant.
Although she did not specify exactly when she made these observations or provide intricate
details of the circumstances surrounding her observations, the information she provided was
sufficient in light of her other statements. For example, she indicated that defendant had
admitted to her that he usells marijuana and cocaine." R. 72 (emphasis added). She also
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stated that "the illicit sales operation is ongoing and has been long term." R. 72 (emphasis
added). This information was more than sufficient to establish that defendant's drug sales
were ongoing and that evidence of those drug sales would be found in defendant's home.2
The majority improperly describes these facts as a "conclusory outline," rather than "a
detailed description of [the] CI's statement." Id. at f 21. The majority thus requires that the
affidavit detail the circumstances surrounding every observation of an informant. As noted
by the dissent, "[t]he Fourth Amendment's search warrant requirements are not that
burdensome." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 36 (Billings, J., dissenting). The majority's
rigid and hypertechnical requirements of detail are far beyond what is required under Gates.
All that is required is that the affidavit include "some of the underlying circumstances from
which the officer concluded that that the informant was "credible" or his information
"reliable." Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 n.6, 103 S.Ct. at 2328 n.6 (quoting Aguilar, 378 U.S at
114,103 S.Ct. at 1514) (emphasis added in Gates). The Fourth Amendment does not require
an "elaborate exegeses of the informant's tip." Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Gates
upheld a search warrant which disclosed none of the circumstances surrounding the
anonymous informant's observations.

2

Even though the CI specifically stated that "the illicit sales operation is ongoing and
has been long term," R. 73, the majority refuses to accept the fact that defendant's criminal
activity was ongoing. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 21 & n.5. As noted, the majority's
refusal to countenance the CI's statement violates its duty to defer to the magistrate's
probable cause determination. See Babbell, 770 P.2d at 992.
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(c) Detailing Detective McCarthy's Surveillance
The majority also complains about the lack of detail Detective McCarthy provided
regarding his surveillance of defendant's home. The affidavit advised the magistrate that
Detective McCarthy performed surveillance of defendant's home between 8:00 p.m. on June
14,2000 and 6:00 a.m. on June 15,2000. R. 73. It revealed that Detective McCarthy did not
observe anyone at the residence initially, but that after midnight he "observed some short
term traffic" at the residence that he believed was drug-related. R. 73-74. The affidavit
further stated that at Detective McCarthy's direction, a patrol officer performed a traffic stop
of one of the short-term visitors to defendant's home and arrested him on outstanding
warrants. R. 73. In a search incident to arrest, police discovered approximately one-half
ounce of marijuana on the driver's person and a plastic twist of cocaine residue in the car. R.
73. However, no paraphernalia used to ingest marijuana or cocaine was found in either the
car or on the driver's person, which suggested to the officer that it had been purchased at
defendant's home. R. 73-74.
The majority criticizes Detective McCarthy for not stating "how many vehicles he
saw visit [defendant's] home, whether any of these vehicles arrived during [defendant's]
alleged hours of operation, whether any of these vehicles or their drivers were described by
CI, whether the stopped person was a person described by CI or was driving a vehicle
described by CI, "how long" the stopped person was at the residence, "whether any of the
vehicles [described by the CI] were part of the short-term traffic," and what time the short
term traffic was actually observed. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at ff 24-25 & n.7. Again, the
i
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majority holds that the information provided is only "conclusory" and is thus not "helpful."
A/.at1H[23-24.
Once again, the majority has imposed a burden far greater than required under Gates.
Gates held that the Fourth Amendment does not require " 'that each factual allegation which
the affiant puts forth must be independently documented, or that each and every fact which
contributed to his conclusions be spelled out in the complaint.1" Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 n.6,
103 S.Ct. at 2328 n.6 (quoting Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 224, 85 S.Ct. 1365,
1371 (1965)). The amendment '"simply requires that enough information be presented to
the [magistrate] to enable him to make the judgment that the charges are not capricious and
are sufficiently supported to justify bringing into play the further steps of the criminal
process.'" Id (quoting Jaben, 381 U.S. at 224-25, 85 S.Ct. at 1371) (emphasis added). As
noted by the dissent here, the description of Detective McCarthy's investigation was more
than sufficient to corroborate the CI's tip and the majority's refusal to countenance it "is
contrary to the deference we should afford to the magistrate in determining whether a search
warrant is valid." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at ^ 43 (Billings, J., dissenting).
(d) Detailing Other Facts
Finally, Detective McCarthy states in his affidavit that the CI told him of defendant's
"hours of operation," that defendant was home "infrequently and usually during the late
evening hours," that his "only legitimate source of income isfroma part time waiter's job at
a Salt Lake City restaurant," and that he purchased the home within the last couple of
months. R. 73. Again, the majority criticizes this information for a lack of detail,
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complaining that Detective McCarthy failed to relate the CI's description of the cars and
house and their actual description. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at f 19,21,26. While more
detail may have been useful, it was not critical here. The fact that no one knew when
defendant was scheduled to work reasonably suggests that he did not in fact maintain full
time employment but worked part time. Moreover, the magistrate could reasonably conclude
that the CI accurately identified the owner of the vehicle used by defendant where Detective
McCarthy indicated that "the registered owner was as described by CI." R. 73; see Babbell,
770 P.2d at 992 (holding that magistrate may construe "matched the description" to mean
that truck matched description given by CI).
4. The Majority Opinion Improperly Refuses to Recognize the CPs
Statement Against Penal Interest
The majority also errs in concluding that the "CI made no statement against penal
interest" because "there is no other evidence against him." Id. atfflf17-18. As noted by the
dissent below, Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at ^f 35, the majority's holding that other evidence
is required conflicts with the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (1971). In that case, the Supreme Court held that
"[ajdmissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia
of credibility—sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search." Harris,
403 U.S. at 583, 91 S.Ct. at 2082. Nothing in the opinion suggests that other evidence
against an informant who incriminates himself must exist before his statement can be
considered a statement against penal interest. See id. at 583-85, 91 S.Ct. at 2082.
* * *
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In summary, the majority opinion is in direct conflict with Gates. As noted by the
dissent, it "undermines what should be our preference for searches conducted pursuant to
search warrants." Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, at ^ 44. Moreover, it disregards the deference
that should be afforded to the magistrate's probable cause determination. Under a proper
analysis under Gates, the affidavit here was more than sufficient to establish probable cause
to believe that contraband would be found in defendant's residence as asserted by the
informant.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the
judgment of the court of appeals.
Respectfully submitted December 29, 2003.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

^JEFFREY S. GRAY
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Petitioner
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DAVIS, Judge:
Kl
Anthony A. Saddler (Saddler) appeals his conviction for
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8 (Supp. 2000). Saddler challenges the trial court's
order denying his motion to suppress evidence and upholding the
constitutionality of the search warrant. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
%2
On June 15, 2000, Detective Bill McCarthy (McCarthy)
obtained a warrant to search Saddler's residence for marijuana,
cocaine, and related items. In issuing the search warrant, the
magistrate relied on an affidavit provided by McCarthy, who
prepared the affidavit using information from a confidential
informant (CI). The affidavit established McCarthy's nineteen
years of general police experience and his specific experience
and training in narcotics investigation. It also stated "CI has
not been promised nor paid for any of the information provided,"
and claimed "CI . . . provided the information out of a sense of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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guilt and desire to stop the sales and usage of controlled
substances into the community." Further, it requested "the
courts not . . . require [McCarthy] to publish the CI' s name,"
for McCarthy "believe[d] . . . the CI [could] be harmed if CI's
name were published."
13

According to the affidavit, CI told McCarthy the following:
CI has known the suspect, Saddler for
over one year;
CI has observed the suspect use cocaine
and marijuana on numerous occasions during
the last year;
CI has used marijuana with the suspect
on several occasions;
CI has been to the premises numerous
times, the most recent being within the last
week to ten days, and observed approximately
three to four pounds of marijuana;
CI has observed three scales inside the
home, that the suspect uses to weigh out
repackaged marijuana for resale;
CI has observed cocaine inside the
premises, along with packaging material;
CI has observed the suspect carry
marijuana and cocaine on his person;
The suspect has told CI that the suspect
sells marijuana and cocaine;
CI has observed the suspect sell and use
controlled substances, inside the named
premises;
CI has been told by the suspect that the
suspect recently purchased the listed
premises;
CI states that the suspect's only
legitimate source of income is from a parttime waiter's job at a Salt Lake City
restaurant, BACI's;
CI states that the suspect sells
controlled substances to be able to afford
his own usage and as a separate source of
income;
CI provided a description of the home, a
vehicle frequently used by the suspect
(female companion of suspect), and hours of
operation for the suspect;
CI states that the suspect is home
infrequently and usually during the late
evening hours.
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The affidavit also describes McCarthy's corroboration
efforts. On June 14 and 15, 2000, McCarthy conducted
surveillance of Saddler's home between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
and did not observe anyone. At an unspecified time on June 15,
McCarthy observed some "short term traffic," which he believed
was "drug related." West Valley Police stopped one of the
vehicles leaving the premises and found the driver in possession
of one-half ounce of marijuana. Police found no drug
paraphernalia in the vehicle or on the driver's person, which
indicated to McCarthy "the marijuana was purchased from
[Saddler's] premises."
f5
McCarthy also "observed vehicles described by CI at
[Saddler's] premises and the registered owner was a [sic]
described by CI." Finally, McCarthy checked BACI's restaurant on
June 15, and Saddler "was not at work and it was unknown when he
was scheduled to return."
116
After obtaining and executing the search warrant, on June
15, police seized approximately ten ounces of marijuana and one
gram of cocaine, along with drug packaging material, triple beam
scales, and $478,00 in cash. Saddler subsequently filed a motion
to suppress the evidence. After the trial court denied the
motion, Saddler pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, conditional upon
his right to appeal the suppression issue. See State v. Sery,
758 P.2d 935, 938-39 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
17
The sole issue is whether the trial court erred by denying
Saddler's motion to suppress evidence and concluding McCarthy's
affidavit established probable cause to search Saddler's
residence. "[T]his court, like the reviewing court below, is
bound by the contents of the affidavit, we therefore need not
defer to the trial court's finding". . . . " State v. Deluna,
2001 UT App 401,19, 40 P.3d 1136 (quotations and citation
omitted), cert, denied. 2002 Utah LEXIS 150. Instead, '"we make
an independent review of the trial court's determination of the
sufficiency of the written evidence.'" Id. (quoting State v.
Weaver. 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). "However, 'the
[F]ourth [Almendment does not require that the reviewing court
conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's probable cause
determination[.]
[I]nstead, it requires only that the reviewing
court conclude "that the magistrate had a substantial basis for
. . . [determining] that probable cause existed."'" Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d
987, 991 (Utah 1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213,
238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983))). We therefore "pay great
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deference to the magistrate's determination."
P. 2d 1030, 1033 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). l

State v

viah

871

ANALYSIS
f8
Saddler argues McCarthy's affidavit supporting the search
warrant did not establish probable cause for the search. We
agree.
19
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees that "no [wjarrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause." U.S. Const, amend. IV. "[W]hen a search warrant is
issued on the basis of an affidavit, that affidavit must contain
specific facts sufficient to support a determination by a neutral
magistrate that probable cause exists." State v. Babbell, 770
P.2d 987, 990 (Utah 1989). "It is well settled that Utah courts
employ the.ftotality-of-the-circumstances test1 articulated in
Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 76
L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983) to determine the sufficiency of an affidavit
supporting a search warrant." State v. Viah. 871 P.2d 1030, 1033
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). Thus, " [p]robable cause is determined by a
magistrate who fmake[s] a practical common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit[,] . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.1" Id.
(second alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332).
flO "Where, as here, information obtained from [an] informant[]
is the primary support for the search warrant, an analysis of the
totality of the circumstances requires us to consider the three
factors articulated by this court in Kavsville City v. Mulcahv,
943 P.2d 231, 235-36 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)." State v. Deluna,
2001 UT App 401,111, 40 P.3d 1136, cert, denied, 2002 Utah LEXIS

150; ssa state v. Valsnzuela, 2001 U T A P P 332,11i6-i7, 37 P.3d
1. The dissent is concerned that we do not give sufficient
deference to the magistrate's determination. "We pay great
deference to the magistrate's determination," State v. Viah, 871
P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), because "• [a] grudging or
negative attitude toward warrants is inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to
a warrant.1" State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401,110, 40 P.3d 1136,
cert, denied, 2002 Utah LEXIS 150 (citation omitted). However,
our preference for warrants does not extend to warrants that are
not based on probable cause. We will not give deference to the
magistrate if there is no "substantial basis for . . .
[determining] that probable cause existed." Id. at 19.
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260 (extending application of Mulcahv factors to probable cause
determinations). We now consider those three factors.
I.

Type of Informant/Basis of Knowledge

111 The first factor is "the type of tip or informant involved."
Kavsville Citv v. Mulcahv. 943 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah Ct. App.
1997). "After all, • [n]ot all tips are of equal value in
establishing [probable cause].'" Id. (alteration in original)
(citation omitted). "Factors to consider in determining whether
probable cause exists include an informant's veracity,
reliability and basis of knowledge." State v. Purser, 828 P.2d
515, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 233, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2329 (1983)) (other citations
omitted); see also State v. Dronebura, 781 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989) ("Although the veracity, reliability, and basis of
knowledge of confidential informants are no longer strict
prerequisites for establishing probable cause, they are still
relevant considerations, among others, in determining the
existence of probable cause under a totality-of-the-circumstances."
(quotations and citations omitted)).
112 In this case, the basis of knowledge portion is satisfied.2
Basis of knowledge is satisfied where the informant speaks from
personal observation. See Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. Here, the
affidavit sets forth information based on CIfs personal
observations. For instance, the affidavit notes that CI
"observed [Saddler] use cocaine and marijuana," "observed approx.
3 to 4 pounds of marijuana," and "observed cocaine inside
[Saddler's] premises."
1fl3 However, the veracity and reliability portions are not
satisfied. Generally, "an ordinary citizen-informant needs no
independent proof of reliability or veracity." State v. Deluna,
2001 UT App 401,1l4, 40 P.3d 1136, cert, denied. 2002 Utah LEXIS
150 (quotations and citations omitted). A citizen-informant is
"an average citizen who is in a position to supply information by
virtue of having been a crime victim or witness." State v.
2. The dissent argues that we dismiss the basis of knowledge
portion too quickly in our analysis of the totality of the
circumstances. This is not true. We acknowledge that the basis
of knowledge portion of the test is satisfied. However, the
basis of knowledge portion alone does not establish probable
cause in the absence of information concerning CI's veracity and
reliability. While basis of knowledge tells us how CI acquired
his information, it does not tell us whether he was qualified to
assess the information, whether he relayed the information
accurately, or whether he is trustworthy.
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Whits, 851 P;2d 1195, 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quotations and
citations omitted). Such an informant "thereafter relates to the
police what he knows as a matter of civic duty." State v. Evans,
692 So. 2d 216, 219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (quotations and
citations omitted) (cited for this proposition by Mulcahy, 943
P.2dat 235 n.2). Alternatively, a police-informant (or
criminal-informant) is "one who gains information through
involvement in criminal activity or who is f"motivated . . . by
pecuniary gain,"•" and thus is "lower on the reliability scale."
MyilcflilY/ 943 P.2d at 235 n.2 (quoting Evans. 692 So. 2d at 219) .
1(14^ In this case, we do not know whether CI was a citizen- or a
police-informant. However, we do know that CI "used marijuana
with [Saddler] on several occasions." Thus, we know CI was part
of the criminal environment, lowering his veracity and
reliability. We also know that CI "provided the information out
of a . . . desire to stop the sales and usage of controlled
substances into the community," and that CI was " [neither]
promised nor paid for any of the information provided." Although
this information bolsters reliability and veracity in citizeninformants, £££ Purser. 828 P.2d at 517 (assuming reliability and
veracity for citizen-informant who volunteered the information
and "receive[d] nothing from police in exchange for the
information"), we do not know whether CI qualified as a citizeninformant or volunteered the information to police- Further, we
fail to see how the conclusory statement that CI is providing the
information out of a sense of guilt and a desire to stop the sale
of controlled substances significantly bolsters his veracity and
reliability when he is a participant in the criminal environment
and has not indicated a remorse for his past participation or a
determination to avoid future involvement. See People v.
Kershaw. 195 Cal. Rptr. 311, 314 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (noting
that informants who are "criminals, drug addicts or professional
'stool pigeons 1 " may be motivated to volunteer information not
only for promises or payments, but also for "revenge or the hope
of eliminating criminal competition"), superceded bv statute on
other q¥9Un<3g/ People v. Burch. 232 Cal. Rptr. 502 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) .
H15 Also important to veracity and reliability is whether the
informant is anonymous. tfl[B]ecause an anonymous caller's basis
of knowledge and veracity are typically unknown,' anonymous tips
are toward 'the low-end of the reliability scale.1" Mulcahy, 943
P.2d at 235 (citation omitted). Informants who "g[i]ve their
full names," thus "subject[ing] themselves to a penalty for
providing false information," Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 at fl5, are
more reliable than informants who "hid[e] behind the cloak of
telephonic [or other] anonymity" so that their identities cannot
be traced. State v. McCloskev. 453 N.W.2d 700, 703-04 (Minn.
1990) .
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f16 Here, we do not know whether CI and McCarthy met face-toface or communicated by telephone or letter. Consequently, we do
not know whether McCarthy ever, using his police training and
experience, had the opportunity to evaluate CI's truthfulness.
We also do not know whether CI told McCarthy his name.3
Consequently, we do not know whether CI subjected himself to the
penalty of providing false information. Similarly, we do not
know whether CI had ever provided McCarthy information before and
whether this information proved reliable. See State v. Bailey.
675 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1984) (noting that information in the
affidavit showing "the informant had previously given truthful
information to the police concerning the existence of contraband"
is "an accepted method for establishing an informant's
veracity").
fl7 Next, an informant's reliability and veracity are improved
where he provides information against his penal interest. See
United States v. Harris. 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 2082
(1971) (holding statements "against the informant's penal
interest" "carr[ied] their own indicia of credibility")/ In re
Shon Daniel K. . 959 P.2d 553, 558 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (noting
statements against penal interest are one indication of informant
reliability) .
1fl8 Here, CI made no statement against penal interest. Although
he did admit to using marijuana with Saddler on several
occasions, this admission means nothing if CI did not reveal his
identity, thus subjecting himself to the danger of prosecution.
Furthermore, even if we knew CI's identity, his statement would
still not be an admission against penal interest because there is
no other evidence against him. See State v. Archuleta. 850 P.2d
1232, 1241 n.24 (Utah 1993) (noting the "corpus delicti rule
states that a person may not be convicted of a crime if no
independent evidence, outside of the defendant's own statement,
exists").
1l9
Finally, an informant's veracity arid reliability may be
"'boosted by the detail with which the informant described his
personal observation1 of the [crime]." Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206.
3. The State argues that we should defer to the trial court's
inference that CI was not anonymous. See State v. Babbell, 770
P. 2d 987, 992 (Utah 1989) (acknowledging ambiguity of an
affidavit, but deferring to magistrate's "reasonable
construction" of that ambiguity). We disagree. It is not
reasonable to infer, without more information, that CI, who was
too afraid to allow his name to be published in the affidavit,
was not also too afraid to give his name to the police officer
drafting the affidavit.
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Here, the affidavit provides little more than an outline of what
CI told McCarthy. We do not know the type of relationship CI had
with Saddler or how often and for what purpose CI visited
Saddler. Also, although CI says he saw marijuana, cocaine,
packaging materials, and scales in the home, we do not know how
much marijuana and cocaine he saw, when he saw it, or where it
was located.4 Finally, aside from the conclusory statement that
CI provided a description of the home, a vehicle frequently used
by Saddler, and Saddler's hours of operation, we do not know
anything about CI's actual description of these facts.
II.

Information Detail

f20 "The second Mulcahy factor we must consider is whether 'the
informant gave enough detail about the observed criminal activity
to support a [warrant].'" State v. Deluna. 2001 UT App 401,fl9,
40 P.3d 1136 (alteration in original) (citation omitted), cert,
denied. 2002 Utah LEXIS 150. "It is well established that a
warrant cannot issue solely on the strength of 'a mere conclusory
statement that gives the magistrate virtually no basis at all for
making a judgment regarding probable cause.'" State v. Babbell,
770 P.2d 987, 992 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted). Moreover,
judges should be reluctant to base a probable cause determination
on poorly drafted affidavits. See id. at 992 n.3 (noting the
finding of probable cause was "a very close question" where the
affidavit included the witnesses1 description of a truck but not
the officer's description of the truck he said matched the
witnesses1 description). "The better approach would be to
require that an affiant take the simple but critical additional
step of clearly and unambiguously stating" the detail provided by
the informant. Id. "A few short minutes spent in more carefully
preparing [an] affidavit would have ensured the protection of the
accused's constitutional rights while saving a substantial amount
of time for the courts and parties." Id.
1121 Here, we do not know how much detail CI gave. Rather than
provide a detailed description of CI' s statement in the
affidavit, McCarthy provided a conclusory outline of CIfs
statement. We do not know how CI knew Saddler or when and how
often CI visited Saddler's residence. Nor do we know how often
or how recently CI observed controlled substances in Saddler's

4. We know that at some point, CI observed what he described as
three to four pounds of marijuana at Saddler's premises.
However, we do not know when CI made this observation. Although
the affidavit says CI had been to the house within the last seven
to ten days, we cannot reasonably infer that it was during this
visit that CI saw the marijuana.

20020119-CADigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
8 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

residence.5 We also do not know what detail CI gave about
Saddler's residence, routine, hours of operation, vehicles,
clients, or clients' vehicles.6
III.

Confirmation by Police Officer

f22 "The final Mulcahy factor is whether the police officer
independently confirms the informants' information." State v.
Deluna. 2001 UT App 401,120, 40 P.3d 1136, cert, denied. 2002
Utah LEXIS 150. Corroboration "means, in light of the
circumstances, [the officer] confirms enough facts so that he may
reasonably conclude that the information provided is reliable."
Kavsville Citv v. Mulcahv. 943 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) . A police officer "'may corroborate the tip either by
observing the illegal activity or by finding [the material facts]
substantially as described by the informant.'" Id. {citations
omitted).
f23 Here, McCarthy's corroboration was not helpful. First,
McCarthy conducted surveillance of Saddler's premises during the"
hours CI said Saddler was home. Between 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.,
McCarthy saw nothing to corroborate CI's information.

5. The State argues that probable cause exists even though the
affidavit fails to provide specific dates and time periods
because it establishes a course of conduct. We disagree.
"'[W]here the affidavit properly recites facts indicating
activity of a protracted and continuous nature, a course of
conduct, the passage of time becomes less significant.'" State
v, Stromberq. 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation
omitted). Although CI uses the present tense to say Saddler
"sells controlled substances," see State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d
1258, 1261 (Utah 1983) (holding information in search warrant not
stale because the language used was "couched . . . in the present
tense which describes ongoing criminal conduct"), CI only talks
about Saddler using and selling controlled substances from his
home in the past tense and does not provide sufficient detail for
us to ascertain whether the activity was of a protracted and
continuous nature.
6. We do know CI said Saddler was home infrequently and usually
during the late evening hours. Although seemingly helpful, this
detail was discounted by McCarthy's own attempt at corroboration.
When McCarthy conducted surveillance of Saddler's home during the
late evening hours (8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.), he did not gather
any corroborating information.
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124 Second, at some point the next day, McCarthy says he saw
short-term traffic that he believed to be drug related.7 One car
was stopped and one-half ounce of marijuana was found on the
driver, which McCarthy believed was purchased at Saddler's home
because no drug paraphernalia was found. However, McCarthy
provides only conclusory information about this corroborative
effort. See State v. Babbeiy 770 P.2d 987, 992 (Utah 1989) ("It
is well established that a warrant cannot issue solely on the
strength of 'a mere conclusory statement that gives the
magistrate virtually no basis at all for making a judgment
regarding probable cause. •,f (citation omitted)). He does not
state how many vehicles he saw visit Saddler's home, whether any
of these vehicles arrived during Saddler's alleged hours of
operation, whether any of these vehicles or their drivers were
described by CI, whether the stopped person was a person
described by CI or was driving a vehicle described by CI, or how
long the stopped person was at Saddler's home.
f25 Third, McCarthy observed vehicles described by CI at
Saddler's premises whose registered owner was described by CI.
Again, McCarthy provides no detail as to what type of vehicles
were present, how many vehicles he observed, whether they were
part of the short-term traffic, or whether they were present
during Saddler's alleged hours of operation. See id.
f26 Finally, McCarthy visited BACI•s, Saddler's place of
employment, where he learned Saddler was not at work and the
person he spoke to did not know when Saddler was scheduled to
work next. With more detail, this information may have provided
important corroborative detail. However, as is, the information
is practically useless. Although McCarthy established that
Saddler worked at BACI's, we do not know who McCarthy spoke to or
whether that person was in a position to know Saddler's schedule.
We also do not know whether the person McCarthy spoke to thought
it was unusual that Saddler was not currently at work or whether
the person thought Saddler's work schedule in general was
unusual.
CONCLUSION
127 Under the totality of the circumstances, we are convinced
that the search warrant affidavit in this case failed to
establish probable cause for the search of Saddler's home.
Although the affidavit sufficiently established CI's basis of
7, Although the dissent concludes McCarthy saw the short-term
traffic during the early morning hours, no actual time is
provided by the affidavit.
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knowledge, it failed to establish CI's veracity and reliability.
Moreover, the detail and corroboration included in the affidavit
were not enough to establish probable cause in the absence of a
showing of veracity and reliability. Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to
suppress the seized evidence. "Since an error amounting to a
violation of the federal constitution requires reversal unless it
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse [Saddler's]
conviction [] . " State v. Dronebura, 781 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) .
128 Saddler's conviction is reversed and the case is remanded
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

f29

I CONCUR:

/ .

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge (dissenting):
f30 I respectfully dissent. I would conclude that under the
"totality-of-the-circumstances test" required by Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983), the
magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . [determining] that
probable cause existed." State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401,f9, 40
P.3d 1136 (quotations and citations omitted).
131 As a threshold matter, I disagree with the majority's
application of the facts to controlling law. First, I conclude
the affidavit establishes CI's reliability. As the majority
acknowledges, CI's basis of knowledge was strong. The affidavit
set forth facts personally observed by CI over a one-year period:
CI observed Saddler using marijuana and cocaine; CI used
marijuana with Saddler; CI within the last ten days observed
three to four pounds of marijuana; CI observed scales in
Saddler's home that Saddler allegedly used to weigh and package
marijuana for re-sale; CI stated that Saddler admitted to him
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that he sells marijuana and cocaine/ and CI observed Saddler
selling controlled substances inside the named premises.
132 However, the majority dismisses this strong basis of
knowledge and claims the veracity and reliability prongs are not
satisfied. I disagree. Veracity and reliability can be
buttressed by a high degree of detail presented by CI in the
affidavit and independent corroboration of such detail by the
police. S&£ State v. Purser. 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah Ct. App.
1992). Both are present here.
133 CI admittedly used drugs with Saddler in the past. However,
CI was "[neither] promised nor paid for any of the information
provided." This bolsters CI's reliability and veracity. See
State v. Viah, 871 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Because
the confidential informant here received nothing in exchange for
information about [the] illegal activities, the magistrate
properly assumed that the informant was reliable.")/ State v.
Purser. 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (assuming
reliability and veracity for citizen informant who "receive[d]
nothing from the police in exchange for the information"
(citations omitted))•
134 I further disagree with the majority's claim that we do not
know if CI volunteered the information to Officer McCarthy. On
the contrary, a fair reading of the affidavit establishes that he
did. The affidavit plainly states that CI told Officer McCarthy
the information out of "a sense of guilt and a desire to stop the
sales and usage of controlled substances in the community."
Further, the majority refuses to acknowledge CI told Officer
McCarthy CI's name and was therefore not anonymous. Where an
affidavit is ambiguous, we must defer to the magistrate where,
given the affidavit's language, the magistrate could reasonably
construe a meaning that favors a probable cause determination.
S££ State v, BabbgU, 770 P.2d 987, 992 (Utah 1989)
(acknowledging ambiguity of an affidavit, but deferring to
magistrate's "reasonable construction" of that ambiguity).
Although Officer McCarthy did not directly state that he knew
CI's name, a magistrate could reasonably construe Officer
McCarthy's knowledge of CI's name from the affidavit's language.
The affidavit clearly asks that the court not require Officer
McCarthy to "publish the CI's name." One cannot publish a name
one does not know.
135 The majority is hyper-technical in claiming CI's admission
that he used drugs with Saddler was not against his penal
interest and thus did not bolster his reliability. Ssa Hatted
States v. Harris. 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 2082 (1971)
(holding statements "against the informant's penal interest"
"carr[ied] their own indicia of credibility"). As previously
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stated, in my view, the affidavit establishes that CI did reveal
his identity to the officer. I also disagree with the majority's
conclusion that, because there is no other evidence against CI,
there was no admission against penal interest. We simply do not
know if there is other evidence against CI, nor should we expect
such evidence in the affidavit. CI made incriminating statements
with both the possibility that such statements could be
investigated and the possibility that other evidence could be
found. "People do not lightly admit a crime and place critical
evidence in the hands of police in the form of their own
admissions." Id. at ,583, 91 S. Ct. at 2082. In Harris, the
Supreme Court similarly found, without more, that an informant's
disclosure that he purchased illegal whiskey from the defendant
over a period of two years was a statement against penal interest
that "carrfied] [its] own indicia of credibility."8 403 U.S. at
575, 583, 91 S. Ct. at 2078, 2082.
f36 As the majority acknowledges, an informant's veracity and
reliability may be "boosted by the detail with which the
informant described his personal observation of the [crime]."
State v. Bailey. 675 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1984) (quotations and
citation omitted). However, the majority finds the description
of the ongoing use and sale of drugs over a period of a year,
including the observation of scales, packaging material, and
three to four pounds of marijuana within the previous ten days,*
to be insufficient detail. The majority requires the affidavit
recite, for example, more detail about Saddler's residence, such
as, presumably, where in the house CI saw the materials. The
8. According to the Harris court, " [t]hat the informant may be
paid or promised a 'break1 does not eliminate the residual risk
and opprobrium of having admitted criminal conduct." United
States v. Harris. 403 U.S. 573, 583-84, 91 S. Ct. 2075, 2082
(1971) . Here, CI was "[neither] promised nor paid for any of the
information provided."
9. The majority claims they could not reasonably infer CI saw
marijuana within the last ten days. I disagree.
The affidavit provides, "CI has been to the premises numerous
times, the most recent being within the last week to ten days,
and observed approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana." Although this
language arguably does not link the observation of marijuana with
CI's most recent visit to Saddler's premises, we "pay great
deference to the magistrate's determination," State v. Vicrh, 871
P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), and a magistrate could
reasonably infer such a link. £§£ State v. Babbell. 770 P.2d
987, 992 (Utah 1989) (acknowledging ambiguity of an affidavit,
but deferring to magistrate's "reasonable construction" of that
ambiguity).
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Fourth Amendment's search warrant requirements are not that
burdensome. We "pay great deference to the magistrate's
determination," Viah, 871 P.2d at 1033, because '"[a] grudging
or negative attitude . . . toward warrants' is inconsistent with
the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted
pursuant to a warrant." Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 at flO (quoting
Gates. 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S. Ct. at 2331).
137 The majority further complains CI's statements are
conclusory. Again I disagree. The sufficient details include CI
knowing Saddler for over one year and observing cocaine and
marijuana in the home, including three to four pounds of
marijuana within the previous ten days; observation of scales and
packaging material; observation of Saddler selling drugs from the
home; and numerous observations of Saddler using drugs in the
home. Where, as here, "'the affidavit properly recites facts
indicating activity of a protracted and continuous nature, a
course of conduct, the passage of time becomes less
significant."1 State v. Strombercr, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (citation omitted). In Strombera, for instance, the
court noted with approval under similar facts that "[t]he
informant observed marijuana use and marijuana paraphernalia in
the home on not one occasion, but on numerous visits to the
home." Id.
138 Even if veracity and reliability were weak, this is not
fatal under the totality-of-the-circumstances test. See State v.
Hansen. 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987) (noting "an informant's
'reliability' and 'basis of knowledge' are but two relevant
considerations, among others, in determining the existence of
probable cause," and concluding "[a] weakness in one [area] or
the other is not fatal to the warrant so long as" the affidavit,
as a whole, provides a "substantial basis for finding probable
cause") . In sum, however, under the totality-of-thecircumstances, I conclude the affidavit established the veracity
and reliability of CI.
13 9 The majority also faults Officer McCarthy's corroboration of
CI's information. A police officer "may corroborate the tip
either by observing the illegal activity or by finding [the
material facts] substantially as described by the informant."
KaygvUlg CitV V. MulcahV, 943 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(quotations and citations omitted). The majority finds Officer
McCarthy's corroboration unhelpful. On the contrary, I conclude
Officer McCarthy met both prongs of the corroboration
requirement.
1140 Officer McCarthy both observed illegal activity and verified
the facts as described by CI. On June 15, 2000, in early morning
hours (as described by CI), Officer McCarthy observed short term
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traffic to and from Saddler's house which, based on his nineteen
years of experience and training in narcotics investigation, he
believed indicated the sale of drugs in the home. See Purser,
828 P.2d at 516, 518 (concluding that where the detective
"described his narcotics experience" and "observed persons enter
defendant's residence and leave after only a few minutes, . . .
suggest[ing] narcotics trafficking," such corroboration was
helpful in finding probable cause); State v. White, 851 P.2d
1195, 1196-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (finding that where the
detective stated in his affidavit "he had seen vehicles arrive at
the [defendant's residence] and stay for a very short period of
timet,] . . . consistent with the buying and selling of
narcotics," such corroboration supported the state's case).
141 Further, Officer McCarthy had the West Valley Police stop
one of the vehicles leaving the premises and the driver possessed
one half ounce of marijuana. Police found no drug paraphernalia
in the vehicle or on the driver, and based on his training and
experience, Officer McCarthy concluded this indicated the driver
had just purchased marijuana in Saddler's house.
f42 In verifying the facts described by CI, Officer McCarthy
observed the vehicles described by CI at Saddler's home, verified
the registered owner of a vehicle was as described by CI, and
verified that Saddler worked at BACI'S. In my opinion, officer
McCarthy made significant successful efforts to corroborate CI's
information.
f43 In conclusion, I reach a different result than the majority
based on my application of the facts to the law. This can often
happen in the fact sensitive area of the Fourth Amendment.
However, what troubles me about the majority's analysis is that I
think it is contrary to the deference we should afford to the
magistrate in determining whether a search warrant is valid. See
Viah, 871 P.2d at 1033 (noting the "great deference" we pay to
the magistrate's determination). "[T]he [F]ourth [A]mendment
does not require that the reviewing court conduct a de novo
review of the magistrate's probable cause determination[.]
[I]nstead, it requires only that the reviewing court conclude
that the magistrate had a substantial basis for . . .
[determining] that probable cause existed." Deluna, 2001 UT App
401 at f9 (alterations in original) (quotations and citations
omitted). I believe the majority conducts a de novo review and
gives no deference to the magistrate's determination.
144 Furthermore, although the majority pays lip service to the
"totality-of-the-circumstances" standard for the review of search
warrants, I believe it in reality applies the older and stricter
Aguilar-Spinelli test. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d
1280, 1286 (Utah 1983) (applying two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli
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test requiring an affiant demonstrate both basis of knowledge and
reliability/veracity). This has not been the law in Utah since
1983, when State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1260-61 (Utah 1983),
first applied the "totality-of-the-circumstances test" required
by Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332. See also State v.
Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (noting that
"veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of confidential
informants are no longer strict prerequisites for establishing
probable cause,ff and are instead " 'relevant considerations, among
others,1'1 under the totality-of-the-circumstances test (citation
omitted)). The majority's approach undermines what should be our
preference for searches conducted pursuant to search warrants.
See Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 at flO (observing the Fourth
Amendment has a "'strong preference for searches conducted
pursuant to a warrant'" (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.
Ct. at 2331)) .
f45 In sum, I would deny Saddler's motion to suppress and uphold
the search, which was conducted pursuant to a search warrant,
because I conclude under the totality-of-the-circumstances that
the affidavit supporting the issuance of the search warrant
established probable cause to search Saddler's residence.

m.

TiUL^pj

fudith M. B i l l i n g s ,
A s s o c i a t e Presiding Judge
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Addendum B

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

: ss
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE:
JUDGE

ADDRESS

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he has reason to believe
That

(X) on the persons of Saddler, Anthony A., 1/26/73,
(X) on the premises known as 4300 West 3194 South/ a
single family dwelling, on the west side of the road, the front
door faces to the east, the numbers 3194 South appear on the front
of the home mail box in front of the home, to include all
containers, locked and unlocked, rooms/ attics, basements/
outbuildings attached and unattached found within the curtilage.
( ) liTthe vehicles described as N/A
In the City of West Valley, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah,
there is now being possessed or concealed certain property or
evidence described as:
SEE ATTACHMENT "A"
and that said property or evidence:
(X)
(X)
(X)

was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or
has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or
is being possessed with he purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense; or
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct/ possessed by a party to the illegal conduct;
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to
the illegal conduct. (Note requirements of Utah Code
Annotated/ 77-23-3(2)

Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is
evidence of the crime(s) of Possession of Marijuana and Possession
of Cocaine With Intent To Distribute.
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ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT
CONTINUED
ATTACHMENT "A"
1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES,
PLASTIC BAGS, TAPE,
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES,
SHORT STRAWS, GLASS PIPES FOR SMOKING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES.
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES,
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS
BEING SEARCHED FOR.
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTEDNESS.
6. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN ROCK OR POWDER FORM, A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
7. MARIJUANA, A'GREEN LEAFY MATERIAL, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

PAGE TWO
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search
Warrant are:
Your affiant/Detective Bill McCarthy, 8022 , is employed
by the West Valley City Police Department, and is currently
assigned to the Neighborhood Narcotics Unit. Your affiant has been
given the responsibility to investigate narcotic offenses occurring
in West Valley City and surrounding areas.
Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification
and in the investigation of narcotics related offenses. Affiant has
personally purchased various narcotics on numerous occasions in
relation to police investigations. Affiant was previously assigned
to the Metro Narcotics Strike Force and the Drug Enforcement Strike
Force. Your affiant is a certified peace officer in the State of
Utah for over 19 years. Your affiant's specialized training
includes the DEA basic and advanced investigators seminars, as well
as the California Narcotics Officers Association seminars in drug
recognition, identification and investigative techniques.
Your
affiant is also certified in the investigation of Clandestine
Methamphetamine Laboratories.
Your affiant is a certified Bomb
Technician.
*—
Your affiant is investigating Anthony A. Saddler for usage and
distribution of controlled substances, specifically marijuana and
cocaine.
Your affiant received information from a confidential
informant, hereinafter referred to as CI. Your affiant ask the
courts not to require your affiant to publish the CI's name. Your
affiant believes that the CI may be harmed if CI's name were
published. Your affiant was told the following by the CI:
1. CI has known the suspect, Saddler for over 1 year,
2. CI has observed the suspect use cocaine and marijuana on
numerous occasions during the last year,
3. CI has used marijuana with the suspect on several
occasions,
4. CI has been to the premises numerous times, the most recent
being within the last week to ten days, and observed approx. 3 to
4 pounds of marijuana,
5. CI has observed three scales inside the home, that the
suspect uses to weigh out repackaged marijuana for resale,
6. CI has observed cocaine inside the premises, along with
packaging material,
7. CI has observed the suspect carry marijuana and cocaine on
his person,
8. The suspect has told the CI that the suspect sells
marijuana and cocaine,
9. CI has observed the suspect sell and use controlled
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PAGE THREE
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT
substances/ inside the named premises,
10. CI has been told by the suspect that the suspect recently
purchased the listed premises,
11. CI states that the suspect's only legitimate source of
income is from a part time waiter's job at a Salt Lake City
restaurant, BACCI's,
12. CI states that the suspect sells controlled substances to
be able to afford his own usage and as a separate source of income,
13. CI provided a description of the home, a vehicle
frequently used by the suspect (female companion of suspect), and
hours of operation for the suspect,
14. CI states that the suspect is home infrequently and
usually during the late evening hours.
Your affiant was performing surveillance on the suspect at his
home address in West Valley on 6/14/00.
During the initial
surveillance your affiant did not observed anyone at the residence,
the surveillance was intermittent from 2000 hours until 0600
6/15/00. During surveillance on 6/15/00 your affiant observed some
short term traffic which your affiant believes was drug related.
Your affiant had West Valley City Police Patrol perform a traffic
stop on one of the vehicles leaving the listed premises. During
the aforementioned traffic stop the driver was arrested for
outstanding warrants and later found to be in possession of
marijuana, approximately one half ounce. During the search of the
vehicle a small section of plastic bag was found, by affiant, and
appears to have residue of cocaine inside the twist section of the
bag. Your affiant assisted in the search of the vehicle and would
like to inform the courts that no drug paraphernalia, used in the
ingestion of marijuana or cocaine, was located.
Your affiant was
told by the transporting officers, of the arrested person, that no
drug paraphernalia was found on the subject, Oba Tramel.
Your affiant believes that the observations of the CI are
first hand, accurate and truth full, for the following reasons.
CI's observations are first hand and from a person that has used
marijuana and would recognized the substance when observed. CI has
not been promised nor paid for any of the information provided. CI
has provided the information out of a sense of guilt and desire to
stop the sales and usage of controlled substances into the
community. CI's observations were over a long period of time, even
though the suspect has only recently occupied the listed premises,
within the last couple of months. CI states that the illicit sales
operation is ongoing and has been long term.
Your affiant observed vehicles described by CI at the named
premises and the registered owner was a described by CI. Your
affiant has observed what your affiant believes to be drug traffic,
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PAGE FOUR
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT
short term traffic coming and going to the listed premises.
Further one of the short visitors was stopped and found to be in
possession of marijuana and packaging material with residue of
cocaine- Further the arrested person was not found with any
instruments used in the ingestion of controlled substances, which
your affiant believed shows that the marijuana was purchased from
the listed premises.
Your affiant was told that the suspect is home infrequently
and works at a restaurant in Salt Lake City. Your affiant was
told that the employment is part time, your affiant checked on
6/15/00 and the suspect was not at work and it was unknown when he
was scheduled to return.
Your affiant believes that the premises should be searched for
marijuana,
cocaine
and
associated
packaging
material
and
instruments used to ingest controlled substances. Affiant has been
told that all these items have been observed inside the listed
premises.
Your affiant believes that the suspect should be
searched, affiant has been told that the suspect sells, uses and
carries controlled substances on his person.
Your affiant prays for any time , announced authority of
service. Your affiant has been told that the suspect is usually
only at home during the late evening hours and your affiant's
observations have confirmed this.
Your affiant has reviewed the attached affidavit with Deputy
Salt Lake County District Attorney B. Kent Morgan and it has ben
approved to be presented to the courts for anytime and announced
authority of service.
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PAGE FIVE
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for
the seizure of said items:
( ) in the day time.
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or
altered, or for other good reasons to wit:
SEE BODY OF AFFIDAVIT
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer executing
the requested warrant not be required to give notice of the
officer's authority or purpose because:
( ) physical harm may result to any person if notice
were given; or
( ) the property sought may be quickly destroyed/
disposed of/ or secreted.
N/A

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME t h i s

/ 5 _ d a y of 1 ^ ^ 2 0 0 0 .

r.%^°
Time y-*- /£
>
JUDC
IN THE ffH*KD DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND "EOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT
NO
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the state of Utah,
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Det.
Bill McCarthy, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe
That

(X) on the persons of Saddler, Anthony A., 1/26/73,
(X) on the premises known as 4300 West 3194 South, a single family
dwelling, on the west side of the road, the front door faces to the east, the
numbers 3194 South appear on the front of the home mail box in front of the
home, to include all containers, locked and unlocked, rooms, attics,
basements, outbuildings attached and unattached found within the curtilage.
( ) in the vehicles described as N/A
In the City of West Valley, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah,
there is now being possessed or concealed certain property or evidence
described as:
SEE ATTACHMENT "A"
which property or evidence:
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed or
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense or
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of
committing or concealing a public offense or
(x) consist of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct,
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.
You are therefore commanded
in the day t i m e ^
at any time of the day or night(good cause having been shown)
to execute without notice of authority or purpose,
(proof under oath being shown that the object of this
search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of or
that harm may result to any person if notice were given.)
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ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT
CONTINUED
ATTACHMENT "A"
1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES,
PLASTIC BAGS, TAPE,
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES,
SHORT STRAWS, GLASS PIPES FOR SMOKING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES.
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES,
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS
BEING SEARCHED FOR.
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTEDNESS.
6. COCAINE, A WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER IN ROCK OR POWDER FORM, A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
7. MARIJUANA, A GREEN LEAFY MATERIAL, A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE,
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\GZ TWO

EARCH WARRANT
o make a search of the above-named or described person(s), vehicle(s), and
remises for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find
he same or any part thereof to bring it forthwith before me at the Third
istrict Court/ County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such property
n your custody, subject to the order of this court.

IVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this

/S

day of

2000
^

^

HE/ 3RD DISTRICT COURT
*—•
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